[Mind, body and the Freudian concept of the psychic].
The purpose of this paper is twofold. In the first place, I intend to set up a general framework for the classification of standard philosophical theories concerning the so-called mind-body problem. Starting with a description of some relevant features of the pretheoretical distinction between the body and the mind. I follow the received distinction between dualistic theories (namely, theories maintaining that mind and body constitute two different ontological realms), monistic theories (that is, theories asserting that, ontologically speaking, only mind or matter exists), and attributive theories (namely, theories positing that mind and body are attributes of a neutral staff). I analyse several versions of each type, paying due attention to interactionism and to the so-called identity theory. In the second place I rise a crucial question concerning Freud's views about the nature of the psychical: was Freud a dualist, a monist or and attributionist? Is it possible to assign Freud a neat position on the matter? I argue that Freud's views of the psychical amount to a kind of monism of a materialistic or physicalistic type. As to the version of monism ascribable to Freud, I maintain that it is impossible to produce a precise and simple answer. He seems to fluctuate between a plain reductionism, a sort of identity theory and, even, some version of epiphenomenism.